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Abstract
This paper models the executive’s choice of whether to resched-
ule external debt as the outcome of an intra-governmental negotiation
process. The executive’s necessity of a confidence vote from the legis-
lature is found to provide the rationale for why some democracies may
not renegotiate their foreign obligations. Empirically, parliamentary
democracies are indeed less prone to reschedule their foreign liabil-
ities or accumulate arrears on them. Most of the democracies that
have been able to significantly reduce their debt/GNP ratio with-
out a ’credit incident’ were parliamentary. Moreover, countries with
stronger political checks on the executive and lower executive turnover
have a lower rescheduling propensity. These results suggest that North
and Weingast’s account of the evolution of institutions in 17th century
England gives substantial mileage in understanding the international
debt markets in the contemporary developing world.
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The payment of foreign debt has been prioritized over the debt this country
has with its own people. We are going to take the bull by the horns. I
announce that the Argentine state will suspend payments on foreign debt.
(inauguration speech of president Rodriguez Saa, Argentina, Dec 2001)
1 Introduction
The incidence of external debt crises seems to follow an endemic pattern:
a number of countries have repeatedly ended up in the unpleasant list of
problem debtors.1 Reinhart, Rogoﬀ and Savastano (2003) recast the light
on the pattern of reincidence of credit disruptions in some countries and
coined the term ’serial defaulters’ to describe countries that have frequently
resorted to defaults to reduce their debt stocks. The aim of this paper is to
examine whether the institutional setting in borrowing countries aﬀect their
external debt policies and may explain the above pattern. I build on the basic
observation that the decision on debt service is typically left to the executive,
and not contemplated by the legislature. This stands in clear contrast to
monetary policy which many countries have delegated to committees. Debt
policy is not necessarily at the discretion of one agent or group however. The
interaction of the executive with the legislature may aﬀect the policy chosen,
in particular if the legislature can credibly pose a threat to the very survival
1 Lindert and Morton (1989) already noted that There is a striking pattern
of statistical significance. In either worldwide lending crisis (the 1930s and
1980-86), the problem debtors tended to be those who had problems earlier.
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of the executive, as is the case in parliamentary democracies.2
The paper shows that countries where the executive requires the confi-
dence of the legislature to remain in oﬃce should exhibit a lower propensity
to default on debts. It then finds empirical support for the hypothesis that,
among developing countries, parliamentary democracies have a lower propen-
sity to reschedule or accumulate arrears on their external liabilities. These
findings are not sensitive to the classification of borderline regime cases, the
quality of democracy and persist if Latin American countries are excluded
from the sample. More generally, I find that the rescheduling propensity of a
country is reduced by within regime institutional features as the checks and
balances on the executive posed by political veto players and lower executive
turnover. The results of the paper might be seen as being in line with those
of Reinhart, Rogoﬀ and Savastano in that they point out that history is of
importance for debt policy. Instead of focusing on the economic record of a
country, however, I find that one important channel through which history
shapes debt policy is given by the form of government laid out at the time
when the Constitution was written.
The theoretical model highlights two diﬀerences between forms of gov-
ernment that might drive the frequency of debt renegotiations. First, parlia-
mentary and presidential regimes give rise to diﬀerent micro-political games
2 I follow the regime classification of Persson and Tabellini (2003) which
relies on the executive’s necessity for a confidence vote to characterize a
parliamentary regime.
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leading to diﬀerent probabilities of policy reversals. Second, as these micro-
political games are conditioned by strikingly diﬀerent threat points, parlia-
mentary and presidential regimes lead to diﬀerent sets of enforceable rela-
tions between the executive and its support basis in the legislature, thereby
aﬀecting the policy outcome. More specifically, an executive needing the con-
tinuous assent of a legislative majority is likely to consider policy proposals
by their impact on his ex post probability of retaining oﬃce. In particular, a
halt to servicing of foreign obligations may restrict the sources of funding and
overall economic eﬃciency in ways likely to be acknowledged and possibly
exploited by political contenders and interest groups.
Interestingly, executive terms in democracies where the survival of the
executive hinges on the assent of the legislature (henceforth parliamentary
democracies) are typically shorter and show greater variation than in pres-
idential democracies.3 This might lead to an expected greater likelihood of
default on debt repayments in such countries, as economic models generally
predict that governments with a higher likelihood of being replaced are more
prone to implement measures implying short-term relief. The confidence re-
quirement rationalizes the fact that parliamentary countries have resorted
to debt reschedulings with lesser frequency in spite of their shorter average
3 For the sample of developing democracies of this paper the average
term in a presidential regime is 4.05 years with a standard deviation of 1.85
(N=78). The corresponding figures for parliamentary countries are 3.53 and
2.08 (N=89). The null hypothesis of equal means can be rejected at the 5%
confidence level.
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oﬃce terms, since it gives the executive a strong motivation: the ability to
remain in oﬃce. This check makes default a less likely equilibrium outcome
in a parliamentary democracy.
The paper suggests that in the absence of a perfect commitment tech-
nology, institutions can play a role in enhancing the credibility of repayment
promises. Such eﬀects in 17th century Britain have been well documented
by North and Weingast (1989):
These changes [the redesign of fiscal and governmental institutions] re-
flected an explicit attempt to make credible the government’s ability to honor
its commitments. Explicit limits on the Crown’s ability unilaterally to al-
ter the terms of its agreements played a key role here, for after the Glorious
Revolution the Crown had to obtain Parliamentary assent to change in its
agreements. As Parliamentarians represented wealth holders, its increased
role markedly reduced the kings ability to renege. p. 804. and ...The Crown
now had to deal with a parliament on an equal footing-indeed, the latter clearly
had the advantage with its now credible threat of dethroning a sovereign who
stepped too far out of line.... In combination, these changes greatly enhanced
the predictability of government decisions. p. 829.
Relation to the literature. Tirole (2003) shows that international
lending to developing countries can be seen as a dual agency problem in
which the government of the borrowing country is always part of the con-
tract, be it explicitly or implicitly, as in principle it holds the prerogative
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of centralizing all operations involving foreign exchange. The repayment of
external debt therefore requires the implicit consent of the government of the
borrowing country, which is the focus of this paper. By and large however,
the recent external debt literature has focused on the inability to repay ra-
tionale to explain sovereign defaults, assuming debt policy to be the result of
decisions taken by a benevolent infinite-horizon planner. The main point of
this paper is that one gains in understanding by looking at the institutional
setup where a decision is taken. A decision to reschedule external debt is
rarely uncontroversial. An indication that there are diﬀerent assessments of
the optimal debt policy for a country at a given time is given by the fact
there have been instances when the announcement of default coincided with
the inauguration speech of presidents (as in Peru 1989 and even the recent
case of Argentina). Further, for strategic reasons, it is generally not optimal
for countries to completely exhaust their reserves (Kohlscheen and O’Connell
(2005)). However, if a default is triggered at a positive level of reserves, this
suggests that it requires a purposeful action rather than being the passive
result of a feasibility constraint. The hypothesis of the paper is that, given
the diﬀerences in preferred debt policies, the institutional setting aﬀects the
frequency at which a country resorts to reschedulings.
A few studies have incorporated political features in the debt literature.
In an influential paper, Alesina and Drazen (1991) showed that rational
politicians could engage in wasteful wars of attrition leading to delays in
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the stabilization of the debt dynamics. In their model, a divided government
leads to a political stalemate due to conflicts over the distribution of the ad-
justment burden. This paper contrasts with that of Alesina and Drazen by
stressing the commitment enhancing checks on the executive present within
a divided government, that may be key when it comes to drastic measures
such as the discontinuation of debt service. Chang (2002) modelled the sov-
ereign default decision as a game between (a better informed) government
and private agents, where the government announces its intended policy and
the population may reverse the decision. I model the default decision as
the result of a negotiating process within the political system. A somewhat
related paper is Riboni (2003) which explores the role of committees and
separation of powers in enhancing commitment in a post election bargaining
game. In his model, however, the agenda setter’s identity is fixed over time,
while in this paper the main reason for risk premia on debt is the prospect
of a change of the agenda setter.
On the empirical front, Block and Vaaler (2003) found that presidential
elections are associated with an average one notch downgrading in the coun-
try’s sovereign debt rating and that risk spreads on bonds rise in pre-election
periods. They argue that sovereigns should preferably avoid issuing bonds in
the six months ahead of (presidential) elections to avoid paying the election
premium. As the executive in a parliamentary regime may influence the tim-
ing of an election, thereby creating an endogeneity problem, their research
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excluded parliamentary countries. In contrast, in this study, the distinction
between forms of government lies at the center of the analysis. To the best of
my knowledge, no study has explicitly treated the diﬀerence between political
systems in this context.
Outline. As the aim of the paper is to focus on institutional features,
I depart from the altruistic, infinite horizon decision maker assumption per-
vading most of the sovereign debt literature. Section 2 compares debt pol-
icy when the policy decision is delegated to an incumbent whose survival
depends on the approval of a veto player (a parliamentary regime) to the
outcome when the incumbent does not face any such immediate threat to his
survival in power and remains in oﬃce irrespective of the policy preferences
of other politicians (a presidential regime).
As the predictions of institutional modelling might be quite sensitive to
the details of the model, the ultimate appeal of an hypothesis, such as the
one in this paper, must be empirically established. This is done in sections
3 and 4, based on a sample covering 59 countries from 1976 to 1999. Using
probit and tobit analysis, I find support for the theoretical predictions.
2 Debt Policy with Delegation
For political institutions to play an interesting role, some heterogeneity must
lead to a conflict of interests. It is clear that, in the limit, for suﬃciently
low (high) levels of net external debt repayments all economic agents might
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favor debt servicing (default). For intermediate levels of net debt repayments
(that are likely to occur unless rational international investors are infinitely
risk averse) debt policy involves the resolution of such conflict of interests.
In this section, I show that in this range the mapping of net debt repayments
to the probability of default is a function of the institutions through which
a decision is reached.
I shall analyze the default decision (henceforth debt policy) when the
electorate consists of two types of voters: stakeholders, who own shares in
the sector bearing an eﬃciency cost from default, and peasants. Peasants
are only aﬀected by the impact of debt policy on the relative price of their
endowment (that could be inelastically supplied labor). The costs of default
(such as depressed asset prices) endure as long as the relations with creditors
are not normalized.
Let ∆J denote the utility gain conditioned on the continuation of debt
service relative to default for an agent of type J  {S, P}, where S denotes
a stakeholder and P a peasant. I will assume that ∆S ≥ 0 and ∆P ≤ 0 ,
i.e., a stakeholder’s utility conditioned on the continuation of debt service
exceeds his utility under default, while the opposite is true for a peasant.4
In Appendix A, I show that although a debt overhang situation could invert
this assumption, rational investors would never let debt levels reach such
situation if there are small oﬃce rents for coalition members. As already
4 Since peasants do not internalize the eﬀect of debt policy on asset prices,
I will assume them to be less keen on debt servicing.
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stated, debt policy will not be aﬀected by institutions if the signs of ∆J are
equal.
Given these assumptions about the conflicting interests over debt poli-
cies, I next ask whose preference prevails. In practice, societies delegate
debt policy decisions to policy makers. As this introduces a principal-agent
relationship, the policy outcome may critically hinge on the motivation of
the politicians deciding over policy. In Section 2.1, I start out with the as-
sumption that citizen-candidate politicians are mainly motivated by their
ability to influence policy, but that compensating oﬀers can be made. In the
Appendix I introduce oﬃce rents as an additional motivation.
On debt policy issues, electoral promises are likely not to be perfectly en-
forceable, so that politicians might be tempted to behave opportunistically,
announcing whichever policy platform that maximizes their chances of elec-
tion. Assume that the distribution of preferences of the electorate is common
knowledge, whilst the type of a particular individual is private information.
With this informational structure there is likely to be a pooling of (irrelevant)
platforms. In such a context (or alternatively when the electoral process is
decided on issues orthogonal to debt policy) the selection of the government
from the pool of politicians is equivalent to a random draw as long as the type
priors are equal for all candidates. This is why I largely abstract from the
pre-electoral stage.5 Note also that, as a result of the lack of commitment,
5 The pre-electoral stage could be important if, for instance, stakeholders
could make campaign contributions that aﬀect the popular vote.
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only preferences of politicians will be relevant. To the extent that the stakes
of stakeholders are higher than those of peasants, stakeholders are likely to
be over-represented in the pool of politicians, since they will face stronger
incentives to enter politics in a citizen-candidate model. The most relevant
proportion in the model is therefore θ, defined as the share of stakeholders
in the pool of politicians. In other words, θ > θ0 if θ0 represents the share of
stakeholders in the population.
2.1 Form of Government
Assume that the status quo is debt servicing and let n denote the number of
elected (groups of) politicians, where only politicians that could potentially
become heads of the executive are considered. Let a parliamentary decision
structure be defined as follows:
I. A senior and a junior coalition partner are elected from the
pool of n politicians to form a government.
II. Senior coalition member proposes a binary debt policy (service
or default) and a transfer b ≥ 0 to junior.
III. Junior coalition member accepts proposal of senior or walks
away. If he walks away, the game returns to step I.
IV. Policy is implemented
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The senior and junior member could be interpreted as the prime-minister
and his support basis in the legislature, respectively. In other words, n is not
simply the number of parties. In particular, in a parliamentary system the
prime-minister and his party in parliament count as two (the senior and the
junior coalition member in the model).
The main feature of an equivalent presidential game is the absence of
steps II and III. The survival of the senior executive does not hinge on the
approval by another player (or group). Typically, dismissal only occurs for
criminal activities. It might be argued that the legislature could punish pres-
idential actions it is not pleased by through voting against bill proposals of
the presidency. Such threats, however, turn out not to be subgame perfect:
once debt policy has been implemented, representatives will vote taking debt
policy as a bygone since there is no direct way of credibly linking the issues.
This is not the case in a parliamentary regime where the threat of unseat-
ing the prime-minister is credible. Since the intended implementation of a
default reveals the type of the senior coalition member, the junior member
might want to replace him by a politician that will seek normalization of
international flows.
As usual, the SPNE is found by solving backwards. After computing
their utilities in the two possible outcomes in stage IV, politicians will act
to achieve their highest payoﬀ in the preceding stages. Coalition members
might be ”bought out” of their ex ante debt policy preferences through side
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payments (b). Note that these cannot be made conditional on type, since
type is not observable ex ante. This implies that both types would extract
transfers when acting as junior coalition members. Further, implicit in this
step is the assumption that transfers can be undone if the support is with-
drawn. This could for instance be the concession of jurisdiction in a given
policy area (ministry) for the coalition member. Transfers in specie are not
an alternative, since once transfers have occurred, nothing precludes the first
politician from requesting a second transfer or act according to his preferred
policy anyway. Conversely, if the policy is decided upon before the transfer,
the second politician would find it optimal to default on the transfer. Hence,
only a compensation instrument directly tied to the survival of the executive
would be credible.
The proof of the following proposition can be found at the end of the
paper:
Proposition 1 Assume that there is some heterogeneity over debt
policy preferences and that there are at least three politicians elegi-
ble for government, with no more than three pro-default (and θ 6= 1
4
or n 6= 4). Then: I) If at least two candidates favor default, and
the stakes of stakeholders in debt policy exceed those of peasants by
a factor in excess of min[ n−1n(1−θ) ;
5
3
], a parliamentary game leads to a
weakly (strictly) lower positive probability of default than a presi-
dential one. II) If one candidate only favors default, the probability
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of default in a parliamentary game is nil.
The satisfaction of the condition on stakes assures that either only stake-
holder politicians make positive transfers to their support basis in the legis-
lature when acting as senior coalition members or, if transfers are optimally
set to zero, the status quo bias is stronger in a parliamentary regime. The
likelihood of default in a parliamentary regime thus equates to the likelihood
of an all peasant government coalition remaining in power, which is shown to
be lower than the probability of a pro-default politician becoming president
in a presidential regime (1− θ).
Note that the proposition holds despite of the fact that the parliamen-
tary game leads to a higher expected turnover of the executive within a
given period. The proposition therefore can explain the empirical fact that
parliamentary regimes reschedule their debts less often in spite of higher ex-
ecutive turnover (see below). Appendix B shows that the proposition can be
generalized to the case of multiple veto players.6
The above result hinges on the inability of coalition members to credibly
signal their types before policy is chosen (as in Alesina and Drazen (1991)).
Note that this inability creates a potential ineﬃciency in the case when both
coalition members are peasants. This is caused by the credible threat of un-
seating the government posed by the stakeholder in case a default is proposed.
6 Also, it can be shown that the results extend to the case where it is
common knowledge that government dissolution would be followed by non-
democratic appointment of the executive.
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Interestingly, the results would not change if we gave coalition members the
ability to signal their types to each other before the policy proposal is made,
since stakeholders would have incentives to introduce noise into the signalling
device.
2.2 Welfare Analysis
A few lines on the eﬃciency of policies under the diﬀerent institutional
arrangements might be worthwhile. First, in the absence of a compensa-
tion mechanism, debt policy will always pick a winning and a losing group if
∆S and ∆P have distinct signs. Depending on the policy decision structure,
defaults may either be too frequent or too rare relative to the first best in
the long run. Note that a default is socially desirable if (and only if)
∆ = θ0∆S + (1− θ0)∆P < 0 (1)
If types were separable, it would be straightforward that an internal trans-
fer mechanism across groups conditioned on policy could be Pareto improv-
ing. If condition (1) does not hold in a presidential country, a constitutional
transfer from stakeholders to peasants conditioned on debt repayment would
be a way of attaining the first best outcome and at the same time reduce
the risk premia of international contracts. No such transfer would be needed
in this case in a parliamentary country if the conditions of Proposition 1.II
were met.7
7 Under the veil of ignorance, a risk neutral agent would prefer to be
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Although a presidential country exhibits a larger default propensity in
general, it is never ruled out that a president may keep debt servicing promises
even if the first best policy is default (as arguably the recent case of Ar-
gentina).8 This occurs when a stakeholder holds power and the aggregate
stakes held in debt servicing by stakeholders as a group (θ0∆S) are too small
relative to the loss imposed by such policy on peasants. Further, a parlia-
mentary country might service debt when rescheduling would be eﬃcient.
2.3 Discussion and Testable Implications
This section has shown how the vote of confidence procedure entailed in par-
liamentary regimes can act as an implicit commitment device in international
debt contracts. First, the confidence requirement makes it more diﬃcult for
the executive in charge to change the status quo as veto players are intro-
duced in the game. By itself, this eﬀect could cut in both directions in terms
of the likelihood of default, however, depending on the proportion of pro-
service and pro-default politicians (Lemma 2). It is the interaction of the
confidence requirement with the magnitude of the stakes involved that leads
born in a parliamentary country if and only if E [∆] > 0 in the absence of
compensation mechanisms.
8 Note however that even the case of Argentina highlights the importance
of politics, since the default only occurred when the executive changed. The
suspension of repayments -which for many observers came too late - was
announced during the inauguration speech of the short-lived presidency of
Rodrigues Saa. The already depressed stock markets fell by 8% on the re-
opening day after the announcement.
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parliamentary countries to default with lesser frequency than an equivalent
presidential country. Further, the check works on a continuous basis in a
parliamentary as opposed to a presidential regime, where it is stronger in
periods immediately preceding elections.
Arguably the stylized model considered here may give too favorable a view
of veto players. An alternative hypothesis is that veto players make it diﬃcult
to implement budget cuts in the times when they are most needed (as in the
war of attrition model of Alesina and Drazen (1991)). This might come to
the disadvantage of international contracts if budget cuts are a precondition
for repayments.
Thus, the question of the eﬀect of the political system on foreign debt
policy is ultimately an empirical one. What testable implications can we
derive from the theory? The proposition relies on necessary conditions for
n. Note however that the condition n ≥ 3 is rather loose, since the prime-
minister and his support basis in the legislature count as two players - even
if they belong to the same party. Basically, a suﬃcient condition for the
requirement to be met is that there is an alternative party that could possibly
contest the incumbent. This means that we want to exclude non-democratic
regimes from the sample.
When politicians are policy motivated and stakes are such that side-
payments within the coalition are optimally set to zero, the theoretical pre-
dictions also contain a necessary condition on θ, i.e., the share of politicians
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favoring debt servicing. Note, however, that when stakes of stakeholders ex-
ceed those of peasant politicians in a way that induces positive side payments
within the governing coalition or in the case that politicians do obtain oﬃce
rents the restriction on θ is dropped. More specifically, a suﬃcient (but not
necessary) condition for this to be the case is that stakes of stakeholders in
debt policy exceed those of peasants by 2
3
. I consider these conditions to be
highly plausible.
The theory gives us four hypotheses to take to the data. The first is that
parliamentary countries are less prone to reschedule their external obligations
or accumulate arrears in repayments, ceteris paribus. The second hypothesis
is that more constrained executives are less likely to resort to debt reschedul-
ing, as the introduction of veto players reduces the likelihood of default (see
Appendix B). Also, default is less likely with coalition governments. Finally,
higher political turnover should increase the likelihood of discontinuation of
debt servicing as the probability that at some point a peasant politician
decides on policy is increased.9
9 Further predictions can be derived on the eﬀect of presidential term lim-
its. In particular, in presidential countries where stakeholders maymake cam-
paign contributions and a substantial share of the electorate is uninformed
about the eﬀects of debt policy, there might be a debt servicing incumbent
advantage. In my database (that contains 86 democratic presidential elec-
tions), the probability of relection of a president following a term in which
there was no onset of arrears on repayment, is 17.9%. Following onset of
arrears, the probability is just 5.2% (Ukraine’s Leonid Kuchma was the only




When taking the model to the data, I impose some restrictions on the sample
to focus on the countries for which the model is more likely to apply: namely,
democratic developing economies not eﬀectively excluded from private inter-
national debt markets.
I start by excluding all countries without a sovereign credit rating assigned
at any time up to June 2002 by Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s. Presumably,
such countries have not been particularly active in private markets and could
primarily be involved in operations with multilateral institutions. The po-
litical interactions in oﬃcial lending relations might be much less clear-cut.
Admittedly, there might be a sample selection problem: it is possible that
this criterion itself is a function of the default propensity. In particular, if
the theory is right, excluded countries should be predominantly presidential
or have unchecked executives. However, including countries that have been
inactive in private lending would introduce a severe bias, since some coun-
tries might not reschedule their debts simply because they were not able to
borrow in the first place. The criterion still allows the inclusion of the vast
majority of middle-income countries for which data are available.
I also exclude the countries for which the (lagged) credit rating is above
A1/A+. A credit rating in the four highest notches is unlikely to be asso-
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ciated with a significant risk of default. This restriction basically eliminates
developed economies. Since the vast majority of developed economies are
parliamentary democracies, this may well bias the results so that reschedul-
ings are too often found in parliamentary countries. As the focus is deliber-
ately on developing economies, this bias might be worthwhile. Any inference
should be limited to this set of countries, however. Excluding non-borrowers
and high-rated countries, I am left with a potential sample of 72 countries.
Since the model is designed for democracies, non democratic regimes are
also excluded. To determine whether a country is classified as a democracy, I
take the average of Freedom’s House political rights and civil liberties indices
that goes from 1 (free) to 7 (non free) for each year. Then, I classify a
country as democratic if the simple average of the two indexes is below 5 in
a given year. Country-year observations that do not meet this criterion are
eliminated. The pattern of the results does not change when this threshold is
lowered. The fraction of countries in the sample failing this broad democracy
criterion falls from an average of 49% in the second half of the 1970s, to 39%
in the 1980s and 24% in the 1990s. According to this criterion, for instance,
Indonesia fails the democracy test all the time until 1999. Going in the
opposite direction, Malaysia became non democratic in 1998, Pakistan in
1999 and Russia in 2000.10 64 countries pass this test for at least some years
since 1976. Another five countries are excluded because of missing data.
10 I also exclude the observations for the three countries that have qualified
for the Heavily Indebted Poor Country debt relief initiative after 1995.
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All in all, the total number of countries in the sample is 59, with geograph-
ical coverage as follows: 23 Latin American, 18 (mostly Eastern) European,
13 Asian and 5 African countries. The countries and years in the sample are
listed at the end of the paper.
3.2 Dependent Variables
The baseline dependent variable is a binary indicator, taking a value of one
if a debt rescheduling agreement has been reached in a given year. This
variable is taken as a proxy for sovereign default. Rescheduling agreements
between debtors and oﬃcial creditors are usually reached within the forum of
the Paris Club. Debt towards private creditors is typically renegotiated in the
so called London Club. The workings of the Paris Club have been described
by Sevigny (1990) and at the home page of the institution. According to
the latter source, the general principles are case by case analysis, consensus
among creditors, conditionality, solidarity and comparability of treatment for
non-oﬃcial creditors. On conditionality, the text reads: Paris Club creditors
reschedule a country’s debt to respond to a situation of imminent default,
and in the context of the debtor’s taking adequate measures to correct the
situation through an IMF program.11
I considered the debt relief agreements reached with commercial banks
and oﬃcial creditors between 1980 and 2000 listed in theWorld Bank’s Global
11 http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/presentation/. Sevigny considers immi-
nent default as one of the basic principles.
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Development Finance 2001.12 To be on the conservative side, debt buyback
and voluntary debt swaps operations were not considered as they are pre-
sumably performed on a voluntary basis. Further, I did not consider the
few episodes not associated with repayment arrears.13 While I note that the
simple event of a rescheduling does not necessarily imply negative returns,14
it does constitute a change in the original terms of the contract. The advan-
tage of the variable considered here is that it includes renegotiations of debt
towards both, public and private creditors.
3.3 Institutional Variables
3.3.1 Form of Government
The theoretical model relied on the existence of a credible threat to "unseat"
the executive. Persson and Tabellini (2003) take the confidence requirement
on the executive as the dividing line between presidential and parliamen-
tary regimes. I use their classification, taking the confidence requirement
as a proxy for the credibility of the threat of unseating the executive. Ac-
12 Tables A2.2 and A3.2. Observations also listed in Table A3.1 are ex-
cluded. (p.157-182). For the time span previous to 1980, I considered all
Paris Club agreements plus defaults and reschedulings listed in Cline (1984,
p.224) and Lindert and Morton (1989, p. 92-98).
13 It should be mentioned that the GDF is based on year end positions.
Nothing precludes the onset of arrears and a rescheduling agreement to occur
within the same year.
14 In fact Lindert and Morton (1989) showed that a buy and hold strategy
still gave returns to bonds of developing countries exceeding the returns of
US bonds in the 1930s, in spite of frequent defaults.
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cording to this criterion, 28 of the 59 countries in the sample are parlia-
mentary. To check for sensitivity, I use an alternative classification taken
from the Database of Political Institutions classifying countries to be pres-
idential, semi-presidential or parliamentary. For the first two classes, I let
the presidential dummy take the value of 1 and for the last 0. The list of
countries and their respective classifications is presented in Table 1. The
classification coincides for as many as 52 of the 59 countries. Five of the
seven countries where the two classifications clash are situated in Eastern
Europe. The executive requires a vote of confidence in all of these. However,
DPI classifies Bulgaria, Lithuania, Moldova and Poland as presidential and
Estonia as semi-presidential. Pakistan is classified as presidential according
to the Persson and Tabellini criterion and parliamentary during most of the
time by DPI. South Africa is considered a parliamentary country according
to the vote of confidence requirement, while DPI considers it to be semi-
presidential. Since most Eastern European countries were not democracies
before 1990, my prior is that the results should not be greatly aﬀected by
the classification in the long panel.
3.3.2 Veto Players
Presidential (and parliamentary) regimes vary substantially in the degree of
discretion given to the executive (see for instance Shugart and Carey (1992)
for a comparison of variations of presidential powers in Latin America) and,
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in particular in the number of veto players that can directly interfere in pol-
icy. Henisz (2000) constructed a quantitative measure of political constraints
that embeds diminishing returns to additional veto points, based on a spatial
model of political interactions. The basic rationale is that adding more veto
players to the political game makes it likely that the marginal veto player
has less impact on policy since his preference may well be absorbed by the
preferences of previous veto players.15 Henisz’s Political Constraint Index
(POLCON) is based on the number of branches possessing veto power over
policy, adjusting for the level of alignment of each branch with the executive.
A zero score depicts an unconstrained executive and a score of one the most
constrained. I use the POLCONiii index which considers the political align-
ment of the legislative chambers with the executive. A high opposition in
the legislature may be taken as an additional proxy for the ”threat of being
dethroned” (the first being the confidence requirement dummy).
3.4 Control Variables
As economic control variables I use a number of variables that have been
previously used in the literature on debt rescheduling (for a complete survey
see Babbel (1996)), namely, the debt to GNP, reserves to imports and debt
service to exports ratios and economic growth. All explanatory variables are
lagged. I also construct a variable (polturn) to proxy for political instability.
15 For a detailed theoretical discussion see Tsebelis (2002).
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This variable measures the number of changes of the person in charge of the
executive in the last 10 years. Since the DPI dataset starts from 1975, the
inclusion of this variable limits the time span of the panel.
A number of alternative explanatory variables were tested, namely, cen-
tral government budget deficits, level of GDP per capita, current account
deficits, the growth rate of exports, a dummy variable taking the value of
one for the twelve accession candidates to the European Union in the 1990s16
and the export of goods and services to the GNP ratio (to proxy for the de-
gree of openness). None of these variables has a p-value below 0.4 with the
expected sign when added to the baseline specification.
Economic data are from the World Bank’s Development Indicators CD-
ROM and Global Development Finance and the IMF’s International Finan-
cial Statistics.17
4 Empirical Evidence
I identify a total of 123 debt rescheduling episodes involving democratic coun-
tries between 1976 and 1999. 22 episodes took place in parliamentary coun-
tries (8 of these involving Jamaica). The year 2000 would add another 3 cases,
none of them involving a parliamentary democracy. The table below presents
16 Starting in 1991, when the EU signed the first agreements with Hungary
and Poland.
17 Data for Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Russia and Slovenia were complemented
with information from the US State Department Country Reports and EIU.
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a summary. The lower half lists only non Latin American observations since
it might be suspected that the diﬀerence could be driven by the negative cor-
relation of the parliamentary regime and the Latin American dummies. The
unconditional probability of a parliamentary country rescheduling its exter-
nal obligations in any given year during the period was 4.4%, as compared
to 19.6% for presidential countries. Excluding Latin America, the contrast
remains: 3.3% vs. 18.8%.
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4.1 Incidence of Rescheduling Agreements
I now ask whether this diﬀerence persists after controlling for liquidity and
solvency variables used in previous empirical studies. For this purpose, I run
a pooled probit regression, where the dependent variable is the rescheduling
dummy. The baseline specification has data for 59 countries with an average
time span of 11 years. I do not treat for attrition in the panel.
To eliminate countries in long term default and possibly not active in the
debt markets, I exclude the observations for countries that had accumulated
arrears on principal in excess of 20% of the outstanding medium and long
18 Indonesia would have been the eighth case if the sample had been ex-
tended to include 2000.
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term debt stock in years t-2 and t-3 without having reached a rescheduling
agreement up to year t-1. Failure to eliminate these observations might
bias the results, suggesting for instance that a high debt service to export
ratio is not conducive to a rescheduling agreement (it turns out however that
the coeﬃcients of interest are not aﬀected by this exclusion). I also eliminate
observations for countries that rescheduled foreign obligations in the previous
year. While this comes at the risk of excluding relevant episodes it avoids the
possibility of double counting if a rescheduling is made through more than
one agreement AND arrears were not cleared in the first round. Inspection
shows that the results are not sensitive to the length of this window.
As the focus of this paper lies on the eﬀect of domestic factors, rather
than predictive power, a time dummy for each year is included to control for
changing conditions in international markets, such as international interest
rates, oil prices, and less measurable variables such as shifts in risk aversion,
multilateral institutions’ ”bail-out propensity” and contagion eﬀects. Note
that fixed eﬀects may not be included as the stringent conditions for a full
fledged unobserved eﬀects probit or logit analysis are not met.19 Specifi-
cally, while strict exogeneity might be plausible for some of the institutional
variables in question, it will never hold for the ratio variables: a reschedul-
19 I am constrained by the time invariability of the form of government
dummy and the fact that the fixed-eﬀect probit lacks a consistent estima-
tor. Bertschek and Lechner (1998) did propose GMM estimators for the
probit model based on panel data. However, their estimators rely on strict
exogeneity.
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ing agreement today will have a direct impact on the ratio variables in the
following periods.
Dynamic completeness of the specification cannot be rejected at the usual
confidence levels, allowing for standard inference procedures.20 It seems par-
ticularly plausible for the types of variables used: little would be gained from
including additional lags for ratio variables once more recent observations of
these are available (i.e., the ratio of reserves to imports or debt to GNP two
years ago adds little to the prediction of rescheduling agreements if last year’s
ratio is available).
The regression results are shown in the tables at the end of the paper.
Tables 1a and 1b use the regime classification based on the confidence require-
ment, following Persson and Tabellini (2003). First, note that all economic
variables have the expected sign: external debt reschedulings are more likely
in countries with a high debt service to exports ratio, a high debt to GNP
ratio, a low reserve to imports ratio and a low growth rate.21
20 Specifically, I test for dynamic completeness by estimating
P (yit = 1|xit, bui,t−1) = Φ(xitβ + γ1bui,t−1)
where bui,t−1 is the estimated lagged residual of the pooled probit of regression
1.a. The p-value for the hypothesis Ho : γ1 = 0 is 0.527, implying that the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected. For a discussion the reader is referred to
Wooldridge (2002).
21 The main eﬀect of including a dummy variable indicating whether the
country has rescheduled its debts in the last 10 years (as a proxy for country
specific eﬀects) is to take away the statistical significance of the Latin Amer-
ica dummy variable when the form of government is not ommitted (see Table
1c). This inclusion might introduce a bias in the estimation as the variable
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Among the political explanatory variables, the parliamentary regime vari-
able is significant at the 1% confidence level in 11 out of 12 specifications.
This suggests the rejection of the hypothesis of no eﬀect on the form of gov-
ernment on the rescheduling propensity. Parliamentary democracies are less
prone to reschedule their foreign liabilities. To check the sensitivity of the
results to individual groups, a groupwise deletion routine was implemented
excluding one country at a time. The significance levels of the results were
unaﬀected (e.g. always significant at the 1% confidence level). The compu-
tation of marginal eﬀects suggests that at the mean of the covariates, the
probability of rescheduling in a given year is reduced by 8.43 percentage
points if the Constitution of a country contains the confidence requirement
on the executive. This eﬀect would be equivalent to an increase in reserve
holdings suﬃcient to finance eight months of imports. Regressions 4 to 6
aim at checking whether the result is driven by Latin American countries.
The parliamentary dummy continues giving a sizable eﬀect which is signifi-
cant at the 1% confidence level in most specifications even if Latin American
countries are excluded from the sample. Moreover the eﬀect of the confidence
requirement is larger than that of the Latin America regional variable - which
loses significance in the 1990s.
Further, the POLCONiii variable always has the sign predicted by the
theory: more constrained executives are less likely to reschedule. It is sta-
is correlated with the form of government dummy.
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tistically significant at the 10% confidence level in 10 of the 12 regressions
where it was included. Finally, the executive turnover variable has the ex-
pected sign and is statistically significant in the regressions run for the 1990s.
Countries with a higher political turnover have a higher rescheduling propen-
sity. Table 1c is just a replication of the regressions of Table 1a using the DPI
classification instead. By and large the results point in the same direction.
It might be conjectured that a check on the executive as concerns debt
servicing might come from the judiciary. To check this hypothesis, I instead
run the regressions using the POLCONv index, which also takes the align-
ment of the judiciary and sub-national governments with the executive into
consideration. By and large, the results do not change. When I used an in-
dex only considering the de iure and de facto independence of the Supreme
Court however, as computed by Feld and Voigt (2002), I found that the ef-
fect was not statistically significant, though I obtained the expected sign (i.e.
countries with more independent Supreme Courts tend to reschedule less).
The conclusion is that parliamentary countries have indeed been less
prone to reschedule their foreign obligations ceteris paribus. This result is not
sensitive to the time period covered, the strictness of the democracy criterion
or the classification of borderline political regimes. Further, reschedulings are
less likely the lower the political turnover22 and the higher the political oppo-
22 Amador (2003) argues that higher political turnover should decrease the
likelihood of repudiation as the borrower becomes less capable to accumulate
buﬀer stock savings and operate on a cash in advance basis as in Bulow and
Rogoﬀ (1989). I find that political turnover per se increases the likelihood of
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sition to the executive in the legislature. These results suggest that there is a
limit to Alesina and Drazen’s war of attrition interpretation in this context.
It should be kept in mind that the case against veto players is based on the
premise that the incumbent must change the status quo (and will do this in
the right direction).
4.2 Debt Service Arrears
Table 2 shows the results of a censored tobit regression where the dependent
variable is the increase in the ratio of arrears on long term debt to the volume
of outstanding obligations. Notice that this sample is somewhat diﬀerent
from that in the previous section. First, I am now restricted to the countries
reporting to the GDF. Further, in contrast to the previous section, I do not
exclude country-year observations after the onset of arrears, so that each year
when the country is accumulating arrears is considered.23 As for (lagged)
explanatory variables, the debt service to export ratio is replaced by the
export growth value, since the former variable could be misleading: observed
low debt service might simply be the result of a choice not to pay.
The signs of the economic variables are comparable to those obtained
using the rescheduling dummy as the dependent variable. The parliamentary
regime dummy has the expected sign and is significant in most cases. Also in
default.
23 Hence, I do not need to arbitrarily define which level of accumulation of
arrears constitutes a default.
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line with previous results, if anything, more constrained governments are less
likely to accumulate arrears on repayments, although this eﬀect is significant
only in half of the cases.
4.3 Secondary market
Changes in international credit conditions should aﬀect the prospective prob-
ability of repayment of a country and thus the return of portfolios that con-
tain its bonds. In particular, it might more heavily aﬀect those countries
perceived as vulnerable. The 1990s witnessed two major adverse shocks to
emerging market portfolios, as tracked by JP Morgan’s EMBI indices. The
indices include liquid external-currency-denominated bonds. The first oc-
curred in 1994, when the EMBI index was computed for only six countries
- all of them presidential. The second occurred in October 1997, at the cli-
max of the Southeast Asian debacle. By then, the coverage amounted to 20
countries. All but China and Nigeria can be considered democracies using
the Gastil criterion. All 18 countries recorded negative returns in October
1997. The mean return on bonds of parliamentary democracies was -5.8% vs.
-10.5% for presidential (medians of -3.6% and -10.1% respectively). Equal
means of the returns can be rejected at the 10% confidence level. In par-
ticular, the two countries experiencing the smallest negative external bond
returns in October (Malaysia and Turkey) are the only ones classified as
parliamentary by both the vote of confidence criteria and the DPI classifica-
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tion.24
Dornbusch (2001) argues that the Malaysian response to the crisis cannot
be fully understood without considering the struggle for power between the
Prime Minister, his deputy and the finance minister. He also points out that
the relatively smooth ride cannot be attributed to the imposition of capital
controls. These were not introduced until September 1998. Although in
this case the game seems to have been slightly diﬀerent from that suggested
in the theoretical section, an alternative government seems to have been a
particularly credible threat in the episode, in spite of the following reversion
to a less democratic environment (as measured by the Gastil index).
4.4 Debt Reversals
Reinhart, Rogoﬀ and Savastano (2003) identify 22 episodes of sharp debt
reductions between 1970 and 2000, defined as decreases in the external debt
to GNP ratio of at least 25% in a three year interval. 16 of the 22 episodes
involved countries considered free or partially free by Freedom House at the
time.25 In 11 out of these 16 episodes countries reduced their debt stocks
resorting to debt restructuring. 10 of the 11 restructuring countries are pres-
24 The small size of the sample however makes it meaningless to run a
regression with the usual controls. This is to say that this subsection should
only be taken as an additional indication, rather than a conclusive test.
25 The incidents involving countries that were not considered free were:
Gabon 1978-81, Chile and Swaziland 1985-88, Paraguay 1987-90, Lebanon
1990-93 and Iran 1993-96.
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idential democracies. Jamaica is the only parliamentary case. The only five
countries that managed to reduce external debt without resorting to a debt
rescheduling were Botswana in 1976-79, South Korea in 1985-88, Malaysia
in 1986-89, Papua New Guinea in 1992-95 and Thailand in 1998-01. All but
South Korea are parliamentary democracies. By and large, when looking
at debt reversals, the same pattern that was present in the default table
emerges:
Reductions in External Debt, 1970-2000
obs with rescheduling agreement no default
presidential 11 10 1
parliamentary 5 1 4
non LatAm pres 8 7 1
non LatAm parl 4 none 4
4.5 Parliamentary Defaults
The theory also predicts that default is less likely under coalition govern-
ments, as the number of veto players increases. To test this hypothesis, I use
the information contained in the World Bank DPI, which identifies coalition
governments in the group of parliamentary democracies.26 Only one of the
17 external debt reschedulings (i.e. 5.9%) involving a parliamentary democ-
racy occurred when, according to the database, a coalition government was
in place, namely Turkey at the end of the 1970s. When taking the whole
26 I consider a coalition government to be in power when the variable IP-
COH takes on values 2 or 3. Note that to be consistent with the database, I
consider the DPI based regime classification.
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sample, I find that 28.9% of the parliamentary democracies were ruled by
coalition governments.
A closer look into the cases of debt rescheduling by parliamentary coun-
tries is revealing. If the theory applies, these are likely to be the cases where
the institutional mechanisms alluded to in the paper are the weakest among
parliamentary regimes.
In the last 25 years only three countries with undisputable parliamen-
tary regimes rescheduled their foreign obligations: Jamaica, Trinidad and
Tobago and Turkey. According to the rankings in Kaufmann et al. (2003),
these countries are in positions 26, 19 and 25, respectively, among the 28
parliamentary countries of the panel, in terms of control of corruption.27 As
already mentioned, the theory states that the form of government is im-
material to the rescheduling propensity if the oﬃce rents of junior coalition
members are the overwhelming reason for oﬃce. Moreover, in Jamaica, the
party of the executive - whichever it was - has never controlled less than 70%
of the parliament. Trinidad and Tobago underwent a rescheduling in 1988 at
a time when the party of the prime minister controlled 33 of the 36 seats in
the legislative house.28
The largest parliamentary democracy rescheduling its debts is Turkey,
27 The point estimates refer to year 2002 (
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance).
28 Although sacked cabinet members were forming a new party ... to oppose
what they regard as a dangerously authoritarian style of government. (EIU
Country Report No.3, 1988).
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which defaulted on its external obligations in 1977 amidst a period of great
political instability. The country had been governed by rapidly alternating
coalitions in the previous years. General elections were anticipated from Oc-
tober to June. The default occurred in July amidst a political vacuum after
the elections turned out to be indecisive. Celasun and Rodrik (1989) provide
a detailed description of the Turkish default. Like Dornbusch (2001), the
authors argue that the episode cannot be fully understood without a com-
prehension of the political scenario, even though their focus is on economic
issues.
5 Conclusion
Parliamentary democracies have a lower propensity to reschedule their debts
and accumulate arrears on repayments. This is confirmed by the data even
when developed economies - of which almost all are parliamentary democ-
racies - are not considered. Furthermore, an increase in the number of veto
players appears to reduce the likelihood of credit incidents. This suggests
that North and Weingast’s checks and balances interpretation extends to
present day international debt contracts.
It is important to note that the theory does not say that a presidential
democracy will necessarily default at lower repayment burdens than a parlia-
mentary democracy. In principle, nothing precludes a president from holding
on to a debt servicing strategy when this is already socially ineﬃcient. In the
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long run or in a large cross-section of countries, however, there will be more
changes in course in the political systems in which more power is vested in
the executive and, in particular, debt service is at greater risk in the coun-
tries that lack a credible way of linking policy choices to the survival of the
executive.
Credibility is a key issue in the debate on international credit flows. While
this paper does not rule out that other mechanisms may have influenced
the striking diﬀerence in debt service outcomes between regimes, it shows
that the vote of confidence requirement does significantly enhance the re-
payment commitment. Further, it rationalizes the fact that there are fewer
debt reschedulings in parliamentary democracies in spite of the higher polit-
ical turnover. Finally, the indications of within regime variation seem to be
encouraging for further research on the institutional particularities of debtor
countries.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The proof of the proposition relies on the two lemmas below:
Lemma 1: Assume n ≥ 3, 0 < θ < 1 and (1− n) θ ≤ 3 (and θ 6= 1
4
or
n 6= 4). If at least two candidates favor default and the stakes ratio
|∆S|/|∆P |> n−1n(1−θ) , a parliamentary game leads to a weakly (strictly)
lower positive probability of default than a presidential one.
Proof. Assume |∆S|/|∆P | > n−1n(1−θ) . Note that this implies |∆S|/|∆P | >
1. For a stakeholder politician acting as a senior coalition member, making a
transfer b that is accepted by a peasant politician gives him the value |∆S|−b
(relative to the default outcome). Optimality of the oﬀer requires b to be such
that the utility of making the side payment and servicing debt dominates the
expected utility of not oﬀering a side payment. The latter is determined by
the sum of the probability of the junior coalition member being a stake-
holder and the probability of debt servicing conditioned on a government
dissolution in the first stage, i.e. |∆S|− b > θn−1n−1 |∆S| + n(1−θ)n−1 (1− π0) |∆S|,
where π0 stands for the probability of default conditional on one govern-
ment dissolution. Further, an acceptable oﬀer for a peasant must satisfy
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the condition b − |∆P | ≥ − (1− π0) |∆P |. From this expressions it is clear
that making the minimum acceptable oﬀer b = π0|∆P | is optimal if and only
if |∆S|/|∆P | > n−1n(1−θ) (assuming that no oﬀer is made in case of indiﬀer-
ence). The oﬀer b will be accepted with probability 1. Similarly, for a senior
peasant, b0 = (1− π0) |∆S| if and only if |∆S|/|∆P | < θnn−1 ≤ 1. But this con-
tradicts the initial assumption. Hence, only a senior stakeholder will make
oﬀers. Provided there are at least two peasant politicians, the likelihood
of default in a parliamentary game will be given by the probability of an
all-peasant-coalition, i.e.,
π =











((1− θ)n− 1) (θn− 1)
(n− 2) (n− 3) π
00
29 In a presidential game, the probability of default is (1− θ) irrespective
of n and the presence of a single politician favoring default is suﬃcient to
cause a political risk to securities issued abroad. It remains to show that π ≤
(1− θ) ∀ θ, n ≥ 3.
Assume first that (1− θ)n = 2. Then π0 = 0, since only one peasant
politician would be left after a government dissolution and she would never
be able to form an all-peasant coalition. Hence π = (1−θ)((1−θ)n−1)n−1 which is
strictly less than (1− θ) ∀n ≥ 3. We still need to check what occurs when
29 Note that we have to assume that politicians whose government was
dissolved are not re-elegible. A government dissolution reveals the types of
politicians that formed the government. Hence, the senior coalition member
would attract all votes of peasants whilst the junior coalition member would
attract the votes of stakeholders (since it is clear that he is a stakeholder).
This would lead to the possibility of re-election followed by government dis-
solution ad infinitum. If less than two politicians are elegible, the pool of
politicians is renewed with the same proportions (new general election).
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< (1− θ). Thus, if (1− θ)n = 2 then π <
(1− θ) ∀ θ, n ≥ 3.






n−3 . π < (1− θ) reduces to (n − 2)(n − 3) > 2 which
holds ∀n > 4. We need to check what occurs when 1 ≤ θn ≤ 4. Let
















































< (1− θ). Thus, if (1− θ)n = 3
then π ≤ (1− θ) ∀ θ, n ≥ 3, holding with equality for n = 4 only.
Lemma 2: Assume n ≥ 3, 0 < θ < 1 and (1− n) θ ≤ 3. If at least
two candidates favor default and 1 < |∆S|/|∆P | ≤ θnn−1, a parliamen-
tary game leads to a strictly lower positive probability of default
than a presidential one if and only if 1
2
< θ < 1.
Proof. Assume 1 < |∆S|/|∆P | ≤ θnn−1 . Note that ∀ |∆S|/|∆P | ≤ n−1n(1−θ) ,
b is optimally set to zero. A positive b0 would require |∆S|/|∆P | < θnn−1 ≤ 1,
hence |∆S|/|∆P | < 1 which contradicts the assumption. Hence, in the inexis-
tence of side payments, politicians are purely policy-motivated and a decision
can only be reached by consensus in a parliamentary game. Any diﬀering pol-
icy preferences within the government would lead to government dissolution,
followed by new government formation. The probability of default at any
given time will be given by the probability that both members within a last-
ing government favor a default. Hence, as long as pro debt service politicians
are the majority, the probability of default will be given by
π =
(1− θ) ((1− θ)n− 1)
n− 1 +
µ









((1− θ)n− 1) ((1− θ)n− 2)
(n− 2) (n− 3) +
+
µ
1− ((1− θ)n− 1) ((1− θ)n− 2)
(n− 2) (n− 3) −
(θn− 1) (θn− 2)
(n− 2) (n− 3)
¶
π00
Assume first that (1− θ)n = 2. Then π0 = 0 and π = (1−θ)((1−θ)n−1)n−1 <







< (1− θ) = 2
5
. Now assume that (1− θ)n = 3. Then π00 =








One can show that π < (1− θ) if and only if (n− 2) (n− 3) > 4. But if
pro debt service politicians are the majority n ≥ 6, so that the condition is
always satisfied. We still need to check what occurs when θn = 4: in this












< (1− θ) = 3
7
.
Proof. Assume first that (1− θ)n = 2. Then if 3 ≤ n ≤ 4, Lemma






. Moreover, we have 1
2
< θ ≤ 1
so that Lemma 1 or 2 implies a strictly lower probability of default in a
parliamentary game ∀ n ≥ 5 irrespective of the stakes ratio. Now assume







. Further, we have 1
2
< θ ≤ 1 so that Lemma 1 or 2 renders
a strictly lower probability of default in a parliamentary game ∀ n ≥ 7 for
all |∆S|/|∆P |.
Now note that n−1n(1−θ) is strictly increasing in n. This implies that with
two pro-default politicians |∆S|/|∆P | >3
2
is a suﬃcient condition for a strictly
lower probability of default in a parliamentary game while with three pro-
default politicians |∆S|/|∆P | >5
3
(and θ 6= 1
4
or n 6= 4) would suﬃce for a
weakly (strictly) lower probability. Moreover, if |∆S|/|∆P | > n−1n(1−θ) Lemma
1 applies. Summarizing, |∆S|/|∆P | ≥ min[ n−1n(1−θ) ; 53 ] (and θ 6= 14 or n 6= 4) is
a suﬃcient condition for a weakly (strictly) lower probability of default in a
parliamentary game. This proves the first statement.
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Finally, if there is only one pro-default candidate, he either leads to a
government dissolution or, if he acts as a junior coalition member, aquiesces
to debt servicing.
Appendix A - Debt Overhang
Assume instead that ∆S < 0 and ∆P > 0 and that there are oﬃce rents
R and r that accrue to the senior and the junior coalition member if the





senior proposals are always accepted rendering the check posed by the junior




, it will be optimal
for a stakeholder to reject debt servicing. Moreover, a senior stakeholder
always proposes default, while a senior peasant will propose default if and

















|∆P | is satisfied, default is always proposed. Therefore
rational investors would never lend if repayment were to fall in the region
were ∆S < 0 and ∆P > 0.
Appendix B - Multiple Veto Players
The observation generalizes to the case of multiple veto players checking
the executive. Suppose that instead of one, there are two junior coalition
members who may withdraw their support for the executive. In this case, we
obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 Assume 6 ≤ n ≤ 11, 0 < θ < 1 and (1− n) θ ≤ 4. Then:
I) If at least three candidates favor default and |∆S|/|∆P |> 5
2
, a
parliamentary game leads to a strictly lower positive probability of
default than a presidential one. II) If there are less than three
candidates that favor default, the probability of default in a parlia-
mentary game is nil.
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Proof. Assume |∆S|/|∆P | > 5
2
. Examine first the case (1− θ)n = 3.
A junior coalition member would always accept an arbitrarily small oﬀer






|∆P | and b0 ≥ |∆S| which together imply that




, contradicting the original assumption. Now




























. This ratio is
strictly increasing and reaches 5
2
with n = 11. With a senior peasant, by its


























. If these conditions are satisfied only a
senior stakeholder will make oﬀers. Provided there are at least three peasant
politicians, the likelihood of default in a parliamentary game will be given
by the probability of an all-peasant-coalition, i.e.,
π =
(1− θ) ((1− θ)n− 1) ((1− θ)n− 2)




(n− 1) (n− 2)π
0 +
θn ((1− θ)n− 1)










n− 5 + ..π
000 + ..π0000
Assume first that (1− θ)n = 3. Then π0 = π00 = π000 = π0000 = 0, since
less than three peasant politicians would be left after a government disso-
lution. Hence (1−θ)((1−θ)n−1)((1−θ)n−2)
(n−1)(n−2) < (1− θ) ∀n ≥ 4. Now assume that



















, which holds ∀n ≥ 6. This proves the first
statement.
Finally, if there are less than three candidates that favor default they will
never be able to form an all-peasant coalition.
46
List of Countries 
PARL PARL DPI* rescheduled ? from to PARL PARL DPI rescheduled ? from to
Argentina 0 0 y 1983 1999 Lebanon 0 0 1992 1992
Bahamas 1 2 1991 1997 Lithuania 1 0 1994 1999
Barbados 1 2 1976 1999 Malaysia 1 2 1976 1997
Belize 1 2 1985 1999 Malta 1 2 1976 1999
Bolivia 0 0 y 1978 1995 Mauritius 1 2 1977 1999
Botswana 1 2 1977 1999 Mexico 0 0 y 1980 1999
Brasil 0 0 y 1976 1999 Moldova 1 0 1995 1999
Bulgaria 1 0 y 1992 1999 Morocco 0 0 y 1977 1999
Chile 0 0 y 1988 1999 Nicaragua 0 0 y 1988 1988
Colombia 0 0 y 1976 1999 Pakistan 0 2 1976 1998
Costa Rica 0 0 y 1978 1999 Panama 0 0 y 1980 1999
Croatia ** 0 0 y 1994 1999 Papua NG 1 2 1977 1999
Cyprus 0 0 1981 1999 Paraguay 0 0 1989 1999
Czech Rep. 1 2 1994 1999 Peru 0 0 y 1978 1999
Dominican 0 0 y 1976 1999 Philippines 0 0 y 1982 1999
Ecuador 0 0 y 1978 1999 Poland 1 0 y 1994 1999
Egypt 0 1 y 1976 1990 Romania 1 2 1992 1999
El Salvador 0 0 y 1977 1999 Russia 0 0 y 1993 1999
Estonia 1 1 1993 1999 Slovakia 1 2 1994 1999
Fiji 1 2 1980 1999 Slovenia 1 2 1995 1999
Greece 1 2 1991 1999 South Africa 1 1 1995 1999
Guatemala 0 0 y 1978 1999 South Korea 0 0 1979 1999
Honduras 0 0 y 1976 1999 Thailand 1 2 1979 1999
Hungary 1 2 1987 1999 Trinidad&T. 1 2 y 1979 1999
India 1 2 1976 1999 Tunisia 0 0 1989 1990
Indonesia 0 1 1999 1999 Turkey 1 2 y 1976 1999
Israel 1 2 1987 1999 Ukraine 0 0 y 1995 1999
Jamaica 1 2 y 1977 1999 Uruguay 0 0 1982 1999
Jordan 0 0 y 1991 1999 Venezuela 0 0 y 1976 1999
Latvia 1 2 1994 1999
* 0 presidential - 1 semi-presidential - 2 parliamentary. Regime in which country is classified during most of the sampled time is reported.
** Croatia switched to a parliamentary regime in 2000.
Countries were excluded in years for which Gastil index < 5. Only in sample reschedulings with arrears reported.
Summary statistics
Data used in Probit
# obs average std dev min max
RESC 726 0.094 0.292 0 1
RES/M 726 0.411 0.369 0.029 2.776
DEBTSER/X 726 0.216 0.156 0.003 0.874
DEBT/GNP 726 0.480 0.357 0.014 3.326
GDPGR 726 3.647 5.281 -30.900 38.200
LA 726 0.466 0.499 0 1
PARL 726 0.515 0.500 0 1
POLCONiii 724 0.351 0.165 0.000 0.655
POLTURN 477 0.196 0.123 0.000 0.600
Correlation matrix
RESC RES/M DEBTSER/X DEBT/GNP GDPGR LA PARL POLCONiii
RESC 1
RES/M -0.0868 1
DEBTSER/X 0.2455 -0.0734 1
DEBT/GNP 0.2832 -0.1637 0.3613 1
GDPGR -0.1051 0.1338 -0.0682 -0.0886 1
LA 0.1732 -0.0112 0.225 0.0502 -0.0900 1
PARL -0.2363 0.0336 -0.3748 -0.2038 -0.0082 -0.5022 1
POLCONiii -0.1215 -0.0211 -0.0653 -0.1348 -0.0603 -0.1087 0.2106 1
724 obs
Data used in Tobit
# obs average std dev min max
INC_ARREAR 809 0.006 0.021 0.000 0.359
RES/M 809 0.406 0.360 0.023 2.776
XGR 809 0.096 0.174 -0.405 2.379
DEBT/GNP 809 0.553 0.514 0.040 5.083
GDPGR 809 3.596 4.840 -14.869 38.201
LA 809 0.489 0.500 0 1
PARL 809 0.476 0.500 0 1
POLCONiii 807 0.346 0.165 0.000 0.655
POLTURN 540 0.197 0.124 0.000 0.600
Correlation matrix
INC_ARREAR RES/M XGR DEBT/GNP GDPGR LA PARL POLCONiii
INC_ARREAR 1
RES/M -0.0625 1
XGR -0.1444 -0.0107 1
DEBT/GNP 0.1558 -0.1535 -0.0851 1
GDPGR -0.1856 0.1319 0.2642 -0.1008 1
LA 0.1474 -0.0019 -0.0628 -0.0040 -0.1228 1
PARL -0.1630 0.0270 0.0337 -0.0886 0.0355 -0.4862 1
POLCONiii -0.0835 0.0038 -0.0141 -0.0808 -0.0131 -0.0701 0.2166 1
807 obs
Table 1a - Probit (Persson and Tabellini's classification)
Dependent variable: rescheduling dummy
all all all ex LA ex LA ex LA Gstl<4 90s
reserves/imports -1.193 -0.915 -1.129 -3.509 -6.024 -5.488 -1.396 -0.811
3.03*** 2.40** 2.82*** 3.54*** 4.89*** 4.08*** 2.86*** 1.540
debt service/exports 1.939 2.387 2.038 1.721 2.804 2.365 2.418 -0.540
3.62*** 4.69*** 3.77*** 1.540 2.34** 1.72* 3.66*** 0.540
debt/GNP 0.773 0.727 0.721 0.842 0.843 0.822 0.864 0.927
4.04*** 3.87*** 3.76*** 3.20*** 2.97*** 2.49** 3.74*** 2.94***
GDP growth -0.043 -0.036 -0.042 -0.031 -0.028 -0.025 -0.076 -0.029
2.82*** 2.34** 2.77*** 1.500 1.240 1.040 3.99*** 1.560
LA 0.465 0.703 0.507 0.628 0.110
2.46** 4.02*** 2.68*** 2.64*** 0.420
parliamentary -0.836 -0.741 -1.067 -0.605 -1.008 -1.248
3.97*** 3.45*** 3.72*** 1.610 4.27*** 4.21***
polcon -1.334 -0.931 -4.886 -4.392 -1.281 -2.023
2.62*** 1.73* 4.82*** 3.63*** 1.85* 2.32**
executive turnover 2.275
1.94*
Observations 650 648 648 288 286 286 478 364
Reschedulings 68 68 68 18 18 18 55 24
Pseudo R2 0.319 0.298 0.327 0.356 0.448 0.463 0.399 0.347
Log likelihood -148.35 -152.82 -146.48 -43.33 -37.13 -36.06 -102.62 -57.73
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust z-statistics are presented. Constant and year
dummies included in all regressions.
Alternative explanatory variables tested: budget surplus (z=0.19), GDP p.c. 1975 (-0.55), current account surplus (0.78)
EU candidate dummy (-1.05), export growth (0.85), export of goods and services/GNP (-0.47), debtser**2 (0.22).
Table 1b - Probit
all all all ex LA ex LA ex LA Gstl<4 90s
resch previous 10yrs 1.022 0.991 0.998 2.236 1.764 2.161 1.147 1.298
4.49*** 4.69*** 4.45*** 4.54*** 3.85*** 4.11*** 4.63*** 4.05***
reserves/imports -1.187 -0.936 -1.147 -4.520 -6.650 -6.246 -1.386 -0.921
2.72*** 2.22** 2.61*** 3.29*** 4.38*** 3.62*** 2.52** 1.76*
debt service/exports 1.478 1.831 1.539 2.230 3.024 2.489 1.752 -1.194
2.67*** 3.49*** 2.76*** 1.260 1.90* 1.280 2.63*** 1.110
debt/GNP 0.530 0.500 0.482 0.867 0.738 0.497 0.591 0.719
2.66*** 2.63*** 2.39** 3.04*** 2.44** 1.160 2.42** 1.98**
GDP growth -0.048 -0.039 -0.048 -0.027 -0.024 -0.020 -0.086 -0.032
3.32*** 2.67*** 3.25*** 1.000 0.920 0.630 4.49*** 1.570
LA 0.130 0.400 0.178 0.251 -0.608
0.610 2.16** 0.840 0.950 1.93*
parliamentary -0.822 -0.744 -1.487 -1.193 -0.924 -1.320
3.85*** 3.39*** 4.00*** 2.78*** 3.52*** 3.75***
polcon -1.122 -0.712 -4.485 -3.798 -0.831 -1.743
2.21** 1.320 4.89*** 3.53*** 1.180 1.85*
executive turnover 3.294
2.25**
Observations 650 648 648 288 286 286 478 364
Reschedulings 68 68 68 18 18 18 55 24
Pseudo R2 0.374 0.353 0.378 0.555 0.569 0.607 0.452 0.416
Log likelihood -136.398 -140.847 -135.409 -29.963 -28.993 -26.442 -93.427 -51.682
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust z-statistics are presented. Constant and year
dummies included in all regressions.
Table 1c - Probit (DPI classification)
Dependent variable: rescheduling dummy
all all all ex LA ex LA ex LA Gstl<4 90s
reserves/imports -1.420 -0.915 -1.368 -4.034 -6.024 -5.907 -1.654 -1.243
3.32*** 2.40** 3.14*** 2.90*** 4.89*** 3.67*** 3.11*** 2.10**
debt service/exports 1.984 2.387 2.056 4.747 2.804 4.804 2.549 0.546
3.57*** 4.69*** 3.71*** 3.26*** 2.34** 2.84*** 3.75*** 0.570
debt/GNP 0.811 0.727 0.761 0.712 0.843 0.540 0.889 0.864
4.17*** 3.87*** 3.92*** 2.35** 2.97*** 1.280 3.74*** 2.58***
GDP growth -0.034 -0.036 -0.036 -0.012 -0.028 -0.011 -0.069 -0.016
2.33** 2.34** 2.42** 0.570 1.240 0.420 3.77*** 0.930
LA 0.570 0.703 0.580 0.744 0.071
2.99*** 4.02*** 3.01*** 3.13*** 0.240
parliamentary -1.010 -0.957 -2.349 -1.949 -1.163 -1.784
5.18*** 4.89*** 4.74*** 3.74*** 5.02*** 4.59***
polcon -1.334 -0.768 -4.886 -3.900 -1.269 -2.054
2.62*** 1.460 4.82*** 2.96*** 1.84* 2.43**
executive turnover 2.501
2.00**
Observations 650 648 648 288 286 286 478 364
Reschedulings 68 68 68 18 18 18 55 24
Pseudo R2 0.337 0.298 0.345 0.452 0.448 0.524 0.415 0.390
Log likelihood -144.47 -152.82 -142.44 -36.88 -37.13 -32.02 -99.77 -53.92
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust z-statistics are presented. Constant and year 
dummies included in all regressions.
Table 2 - Censored Tobit
Dependent variable: increase in arrears/LT debt
P & T classification
all all all ex LA ex LA ex LA Gstl<4 90s
reserves/imports -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
1.42 1.55 1.47 0.85 2.26** 1.71* 1.53 1.55
export growth -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.016 -0.015
1.69* 1.71* 1.72* 0.96 0.99 0.97 1.50 0.89
debt/GNP 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.008
2.21** 2.30** 2.20** 1.55 1.72* 1.62 1.73* 1.65*
GDP growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
2.60*** 2.51** 2.60*** 2.38** 2.40** 2.43** 2.95*** 2.36**
LA 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.002 -0.001
1.70* 2.71*** 1.76* 1.16 0.71
parliamentary -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 0.001 -0.005 0.000
3.51*** 3.27*** 1.01 0.20 3.36*** 0.21
polcon -0.007 -0.005 -0.016 -0.017 -0.009 -0.007
1.80* 1.27 3.15*** 3.54*** 1.83* 0.96
executive turnover 0.002
0.36
Observations 798 796 796 407 405 405 662 396
Uncensored 254 254 254 69 69 69 211 97
Wald 103.2 99.44 104.78 28.31 28.26 29.77 95.8 26.16
Log likelihood -3007.36 -2996.79 -2993.99 -2086.74 -2071.17 -2071.15 -2524.46 -1756.81
DPI classification
all all all ex LA ex LA ex LA Gstl<4 90s
reserves/imports -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
1.43 1.55 1.48 0.17 2.26** 0.55 1.53 1.38
export growth -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.022 -0.020 -0.021 -0.018 -0.018
1.71* 1.71* 1.75* 1.09 0.99 1.05 1.60 0.98
debt/GNP 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007
2.36** 2.30** 2.33** 1.73* 1.72* 1.72* 1.81* 1.67*
GDP growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
2.50** 2.51** 2.52** 2.27** 2.40** 2.42** 2.92*** 2.39**
LA 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.001 -0.003
1.05 2.71*** 0.98 0.47 1.28
parliamentary -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006
4.18*** 3.94*** 3.14*** 2.01** 3.73*** 2.14**
polcon -0.007 -0.004 -0.016 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006
1.80* 0.90 3.15*** 1.03 1.88* 0.82
executive turnover 0.007
1.17
Observations 798 796 796 407 405 405 662 396
Uncensored 254 254 254 69 69 69 211 97
Wald 98.91 99.44 102.25 27.03 28.26 30 96.03 27.57
Log likelihood -3001.24 -2996.79 -2987.66 -2080.89 -2071.17 -2067.43 -2517.29 -1752.59
